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BRINGING THE "GOSPEL OF LIFE" TO
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE:
A RELIGIOUS, ETHICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL
FUNDING FOR EMBRYONIC STEM CELL
RESEARCH
Sharon M. Parker*
INTRODUCTION
The "biological revolution" of the twentieth century has forever
changed the course of human history. Our newfound ability to create and
manipulate the very matter of which we are made has enormous potential
for both good and evil. What was once confined to the pages of literature
and science fiction has now become an everyday reality.1 With it has
come the temptation to embrace "a certain Promethean attitude"2 that
denies any limits to what humans can and should do in striving for
knowledge and improvement. This is nowhere more evident than in the
* J.D. Candidate 2001, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America; J.C.L. 1996, Pontifical Gregorian University; S.T.B. 1994, Pontifical
University of St. Thomas Aquinas; B.A. 1990, University of San Francisco. The
author thanks Michael Moses and Richard Doerflinger for their guidance, and her
parents, Bill and Carol Parker, for the gift of life.
1. See, e.g., JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE, FAUST (New Directions, 1941)
(1805); MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN: OR, THE MODERN
PROMETHEUS (Signet Books, 1983) (1816).
2. See JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE ("THE GOSPEL OF LIFE"), 15
(1995) [hereinafter Evangelium Vitae]. For ease of reference, papal encyclicals are
cited by paragraph numbers rather than page numbers.
3. According to legend, Prometheus was a Titan who stole fire from Olympus
and gave it to mankind. For this, the gods punished him by chaining him to a
rock, where an eagle came each day and ate his liver. "The Promethean figure
may be described as one who is constantly striving to unlock the secrets of nature
and who refuses to acknowledge any limits to the human mind's capacity to
understand them. Such an individual might even covet the knowledge of God."
RAYMOND DENNEHY, THE BIOLOGICAL REVOUTION AND THE MYTH OF
PROMETHEUS, in POPE JOHN PAUL II LECTURE SERIES IN BIOETHICS, VOL. II,
BIOETHICAL ISSUES 7, 8 (Francis J. Lescoe and David Q. Liptak eds., 1986). The
author is indebted to Dr. Dennehy for the opening thoughts in this article.
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ethical debates surrounding current scientific research and
experimentation with human embryos.
While theologians, ethicists and scientists are at the forefront of the
debates on bioethics, legislators and judges are not far behind. Where
legislators have not yet passed laws to deal with these new situations, very
often judges must create solutions to resolve new disputes." In particular,
Supreme Court decisions have the potential to bind Congress to judicial
solutions, as illustrated by the seminal American decision on the
constitutional status of unborn life, Roe v. Wade.5
It may surprise some, however, that the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence has not been dispositive of the issues surrounding early
human life.6 In fact, the legal status of unborn human life remains
uncertain because it is treated differently depending upon the context.
Abortion, in vitro fertilization (IVF), embryo research, tort law and
criminal law have each generated separate legal theories backed by
varying moral criteria and public policies.7 In addition, where case law
has followed the reasoning of Roe in not recognizing any legal protection
for early human life, both federal and state legislatures have enacted
statutes and regulations to limit the harm done to the unborn by the
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence.
These issues have loomed large in the background of the current
controversy over federal funding for research involving the creation and
destruction of human embryos. Although biomedical research in
America has used fetal tissue since the 1930s,8 the advent of IVF in the
1970s first gave rise to the widespread possibility of research on embryos.
This is because IVF typically involves the creation of more embryos than
are necessary for implantation in the womb.9 While federal law has never
4. See, e.g., Bill E. Davidoff, Comment, Frozen Embryos: A Need for
Thawing in the Legislative Process, 47 SMU L. REV. 131, 133 (1993).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. See Christine L. Feiler, Note, Human Embryo Experimentation: Regulation
and Relative Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2435, 2439-40 (1998). "Roe and its
progeny.., do not, however, dispose of the embryo research debate. The
Supreme Court's jurisprudence does not prohibit the government from granting
rights to fetuses or embryos; it merely holds that the Constitution does not
obligate the government to do so." Id.
7. Id. at 2438. "The scholarly disagreement over the moral worth and legal
status of the embryo is mirrored in our nation's courts, which currently afford
disparate treatment to embryos in a variety of reproductive contexts." Id.
8. THE NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN
STEM CELL RESEARCH 29 (1999) [hereinafter "THE NBAC REPORT"].
9. Feiler, supra note 6, at 2435-36.
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prohibited the use or destruction of embryos in such research projects, for
more than twenty years federal laws and regulations have banned the use
of federal funds for experiments considered harmful to the human
embryo.' °
Recent scientific discoveries regarding stem cells have reopened the
issue of federal funding for stem cell research. Announcements from the
scientific community in November 1998 reported the success "in isolating
and culturing stem cells obtained from human embryos and fetuses.""
Stem cells are cells from which all tissues in the adult body develop."
Since scientists thought, until recently, that adult cells were not
convertible into other types of cells, they considered use of embryonic
cells or fetal tissue to be the only source for harvesting these
undifferentiated stem cells. 3 This research is of great significance because
it holds the potential to cure diseases such as Parkinson's, Alzheimer's
and diabetes, each of which attacks a certain type of cells within the body
10. Letter from Christopher Smith, Congressman,'to Donna E. Shalala,
Secretary of Health and Human Services (Feb. 11, 1999) (on file with author).
11. THE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, ON HUMAN
EMBRYOS AND STEM CELL RESEARCH: AN APPEAL FOR LEGALLY AND ETHICALLY
RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, 2, available at
http://www.stemcellresearch.org/statement.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 1999); Kevin
Wm. Wildes, S.J., The Stem Cell Report, AMERICA, Oct. 16, 1999, at 12.
12. The NBAC defines stem cells as "cells that have the ability to divide
indefinitely and to give rise to specialized cells as well as to new stems cells with
identical potential." THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 86. In addition to
embryonic stem (ES) cells, embryonic germ (EG) cells have similar properties and
have been the subject of the same types of experiments. See id. at 7. For ease of
reference, both types of research are included in the discussion of ES cells.
13. Recent work by a team of Italian and Canadian scientists has challenged
this assumption. A team led by Dr. Angelo Vescovi of the National Neurological
Institute in Milan has succeeded in converting adult mouse brain cells into blood
cells. See, e.g., Nicolas Wade, Cell Experiment Offers Hope for Tissue Repair,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at A21; Deborah Josefson, Adult Cells May be
Redefinable, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 282, 282 (1999); Laura Johannes, Adult Stem Cells
Have Advantage Battling Disease, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 13, 1999, at B1. "This
transformation [of brain cells into blood cells] has medical significance because if
the human body's tissues should prove to be as interconvertible, patients' tissues
might be repaired from their own cells." Wade, supra, at A21. The potential to
use adult stem (AS) cells has not lessened the demand for embryonic stem cells,
however. It is not certain that AS cells will prove as reliable a source; and
furthermore, NBAC thinks AS cells are difficult and risky to obtain. THE NBAC
REPORT, supra note 8, at 57.
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and destroys otherwise irreplaceable cells.'
4
In early 1999, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
issued an advisory opinion to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on
the availability of federal funding for embryonic stem cell research. 5 The
HHS memorandum stated that, in its understanding of Congress'
directives, such research would fit within the norms established for
federally funded embryo research." This novel interpretation sparked a
storm of controversy between NIH and HHS and many members of
Congress. An advisory opinion issued in September 1999 by the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) continued the controversy by
recommending, among other things, that Congress should fund research
involving both the derivation and the use of embryonic stem cells from
embryos remaining after infertility treatments. The NIH issued new
guidelines in August 2000.18 These guidelines permit the use of federal
funding for research involving stem cells derived from human embryos,
although the derivation process must be accomplished prior to the NIH
research. 9 A failed congressional initiative, the Stem Cell Research Act
of 2000, would have extended federal funding to the derivation of stem
cells as well."'
The difficulties in resolving these questions are numerous. The
problems arise from the fact that in American jurisprudence there is no
uniformity of opinion on the legal status of unborn human life, whether in
or ex utero. This is in part due to the decentralized nature of our political
14. THE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 11, T 2.
See articles cited supra note 13.
15. Memorandum from Harriet Rabb, General Counsel of the Department of
Health and Human Services, to Dr. Harold Varmus, Director of the National
Institutes of Health (Jan. 15, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter "Rabb
Memorandum"].
16. Id. at 1.
17. THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 70. See Wildes, supra note 11, at 12.
The N.B.A.C. was created by presidential executive order in 1995. The
commission makes recommendations to the National Science and Technology
Council on issues in bioethics, public policy and federal research. It has already
done reports on human cloning, the use of human biological materials and treating
persons with mental disorders.
Id.
18. Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000).
19. Id. at 51,979.
20. S. 2015, 106h Cong. (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query
(last visited Mar. 7, 2001).
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and judicial system." It is also due to the lack of consensus in our
pluralistic society regarding the underlying philosophies or rationales that
drive our value judgments in this realm of human life and activity.
Most of the arguments advanced on both sides regarding stem cell
research and government funding thereof have, for obvious reasons, been
secular in nature. The United States was founded on the premise of
religious liberty. Accordingly, the First Amendment, as construed by the
Supreme Court, generally proscribes churches and civil government from
interfering in each other's proper spheres." Furthermore, our society is
composed of people of many different religious faiths and denominations,
as well as people who do not subscribe to any religious belief.
Nonetheless, religious arguments can and have contributed to American
public debates on political matters throughout the course of our nation's
history. However, given the premises of religious liberty and differing
spheres of church and state, it is appropriate to ground political choices in
plausible secular arguments.23
One of the most important contemporary religious thinkers on the
status of unborn life is Pope John Paul II (John Paul). Trained as a
24philosopher as well as a theologian, John Paul has contributed
21. The system of common law is premised on the fact that judges may create
law when there is a gap in the statutory law on a particular issue. See, e.g.,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (6th ed. 1990). Furthermore, the federalist nature
of the Union necessarily entails a lack of uniformity on issues that are within the
purview of the individual States.
22. See, e.g., People ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212
(1948). "[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the
other within its respective sphere." Id. However, the Court recognizes that "[n]o
perfect or absolute separation is really possible." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
23. MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS 6 (1997). Perry argues that it
is not a violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution to make
religious arguments in public debate, but concludes that "a political choice would
violate the norm [of non-establishment] if no plausible secular argument
supported it." Id. The validity of this argument is assumed in the present article.
24. John Paul 11 (1920 - ), born Karol Wojtyla, completed his doctoral studies
in spirituality at the University of St. Thomas Aquinas (the "Angelicum"), in
Rome, Italy. GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE - THE BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN
PAUL II 87 (1999). He earned a second doctorate from the faculty of theology at
the Jagiellonian University in Poland. Id. at 130. The topic of his second
dissertation was Max Scheler's philosophy as a possible basis for Christian ethics.
Id. at 129. He was a professor of philosophical ethics at the University of Lublin,
and Chair of Ethics in the philosophy faculty for twenty-two years, before being
20011
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significantly to discussion of the meaning and dignity of human life
through his writings and speeches." In particular, he has set forth his ideas
on bioethics in his 1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae ("The Gospel of
Life").16 As a Catholic, he bases his thought on the premise that human
beings are created by God and that only in becoming aware of this fact
can the human person understand him or herself. 7 However, he is well
aware that modern society is marked by a pluralism of religious thought
and practice, and therefore he also appeals to what all people can learn by
28the light of reason alone.
This Comment examines the ethical and policy issues surrounding
human embryonic stem cell research and evaluates the opinions in
support and opposition in light of the philosophical and theological beliefs
which underlie such opinions. Part I discusses the background of the
current controversy and explicates the diverging opinions on the issue.
Part II explains the unified approach of John Paul as set forth in
Evangelium Vitae. This part analyzes the various arguments set forth in
Part I in light of John Paul's thought. It also evaluates certain secular
arguments which come to the same general conclusions as John Paul but
which do not rely on any specific religious convictions or presuppositions.
Part III critiques John Paul's thought and offers some criticisms on the
limitations therein, as well as some concluding reflections on possible
solutions that respect both human dignity and American law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Dispute Over Federal Funding for Stem Cell Research
1. The dispute between HHS and Congress over the
interpretation of the statutory ban
Since 1995, Congress consistently attached riders to its annual
elected pope in 1978. Id. at 133, 135.
25. "Andre Frossard, a French author and friend of the pope ... summarized
his grand design as 'the defense of humanity... [E]very one of John Paul II's
encyclicals has to do with some aspect of human life or human activity, and in the
same way, all his addresses ... plead for social justice and sincere goodwill among
men."' MARVIN L. KRIER-MICH, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND MOVEMENTS
225 (1998) (citing ANDRE FROSSARD, PORTRAITS OF JOHN PAUL II 9 (1990)).
26. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2.
27. "[W]hen the sense of God is lost, there is also a tendency to lose the sense
of man, of his dignity and his life[.]" Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, T[ 21.
28. See, e.g., Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, TT 53, 68, 101.
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appropriations bills funding HHS, blocking the use of federal funds for
research involving at any stage the destruction or discarding of human
embryos.29 The language of the 1999 bill provides that federal funds may
not be used for:
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research
purposes; or
(2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are
destroyed, discarded or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or
death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero
under 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a)(2) and section 498(b) of the Public
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 289g(b)). 0
According to its supporters in Congress, this bill was intended to ban
federal funding not only for research involving the direct destruction of
human embryos, but also for research "which follows or depends upon the
destruction of or injury to a human embryo.",31
However, in January 1999, Harriet Rabb, the General Counsel of HHS,
issued a memorandum to Dr. Harold Varmus, the Director of the NIH, in
which she expressed the opinion that the statutory prohibition did not
extend to research using human pluripotent stem cells.3' Rabb's
memorandum was a response to Varmus' request for a legal opinion on
"whether federal funds may be used for research conducted with human
pluripotent stem cells derived from embryos created by in vitro
fertilization or from primordial germ cells isolated from the tissue of non-
living fetuses."33
Rabb reasoned that the ban would not extend to such research because
human pluripotent cells "are not a human embryo within the statutory
definition. 3 4 She cited the statutory definition of a human embryo as
"any organism ... that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis,
cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes or human
29. Richard M. Doerflinger, The political 'science' of embryo research, THE
TIDINGS, Sept. 17, 1999, at 13.
30. Pub. L. No. 105-277, Section 511 (1999).
31. Letter from Christopher Smith to Donna E. Shalala, supra note 10. The
letter was signed by seventy members of Congress.
32. Rabb Memorandum, supra note 15. The term "pluripotent" describes
cells that "can give rise to many types of cells but not all types of cells necessary
for fetal development." NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STEM CELLS: A
Primer, at http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/primer.htm (last visited May 2000).
In contrast, "totipotent" cells have the potential to develop into an entire
organism. Id.
33. Rabb Memorandum, supra note 15, at 1.
34. Id.
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diploid cells,"" and then turned to scientific sources for the meaning of
"organism": "[a]n individual constituted to carry out all life functions." 6
Since pluripotent stem cells (presumably she meant once they have been
excised from an embryo) do not have the capacity to develop into human
beings, Rabb concluded, they are mere cells and do not fall under the acts
banned from federal funding.37 Upon receipt of this memorandum, Dr.
Varmus announced that NIH planned to prepare new guidelines for
embryonic stem cell research in accordance with the interpretation of the
38HHS memorandum.
Congressman Christopher Smith (R-NJ) responded to HHS's
memorandum, expressing "in the strongest possible terms," Congress'
objection to Rabb's memorandum and to Varmus' decision. He stated
unequivocally that such action on the part of NIH "would violate both the
letter and spirit of the federal law banning federal support for research in
which human embryos are harmed or destroyed." 9
Smith criticized Rabb's memorandum on three grounds. First, the
memo impermissibly narrowed the meaning of the federal funding bill.
The bill bans funding for "research in which a human embryo or embryos
are destroyed,, 40 yet Rabb construed it to prohibit only "direct federal
funding of the specific act of destroying the embryo.",41 In this way, Rabb
would allow federal funding for research which depended upon the
destruction of the embryo, as long as the funded research itself did not
cause such destruction. Smith pointed out that the second clause of the
bill (on destroying embryos) was deliberately written in broader language
than the first (on creating embryos), so as to preclude a construction such
as Rabb proposed.
35. Id. at 2. Rabb does not cite the statute from which she quotes this
definition, but the context would suggest it is in the funding bill: Pub. L. No. 105-
277, Section 511.
36. Rabb Memorandum, supra note 15, at 2 (citing MCGRAw-HILL
DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS 1408 (5th ed. 1994)).
37. Id. at 2-3.
38. Letter from Christopher Smith to Donna E. Shalala, supra note 10.
39. Id. at 1.
40. Pub. L. No. 105-227, Section 511 (1999).
41. Letter from Christopher Smith to Donna E. Shalala, supra note 10, at 2.
42. Id. Smith notes that established rules of statutory construction require
that "[w]hen a law has two parallel clauses, one of which is deliberately written in
broader terms than the other, it may not be interpreted to have the same meaning
as the narrower clause." Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983), and cases cited therein). Richard Doerflinger, in his public comment
before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, added that Rabb's
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Second, Smith noted that Rabb's memo ignored the policy reflected in
the current law on the use of federal funds for research on fetal tissue
transplantation. 3 Smith admitted that this law was itself open to criticism,
but argued that nonetheless it was clear that Congress endeavored to
restrict permissive abortion by disallowing federal funds for fetal tissue
transplantation research if such research in any way influences a woman's
decision to procure an abortion or determining the timing or manner of
an abortion.44 Despite the policy set forth by Congress, Rabb's memo,
and the NIH's proposal, would allow for federal funding of research
which determined the timing, method and procedures for destroying the
embryo based solely on the researcher's needs.45
Third, Smith claimed that both Rabb's memorandum and Varmus'
testimony before a Senate subcommittee relied on a new definition of
"human embryo" which thwarted the congressional rider on embryo
research. 46 Rather than being any product of fertilization, or of other
novel scientific means of creating human life, Rabb and Varmus tried to
narrow the definition to include only those entities which "one can show
[are] capable, if implanted in the womb, of becoming a born 'human
being'. 4 7 Smith rejected this definition as an attempt by the NIH to
evade the obvious meaning of the federal law and to begin research that
clearly violated the legal protections that Congress had placed on all
memorandum had violated a second principle of statutory construction; namely,
that "a statue [sic] must be construed to avoid rendering any of its words
superfluous" (citing Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, 519 U.S.
202, 209-10 (1997)). According to Doerflinger, "HHS's interpretation renders the
words 'research in which' superfluous." Richard M. Doerflinger, Public Comment
before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 4, n.7 (Apr. 16, 1999)
(transcript available from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops).
43. Letter from Christopher Smith to Donna E. Shalala, supra note 10, at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The danger of this type of definition is, of course, that any embryo
which is defective would not be considered an embryo at all, and therefore would
not be afforded any protection by the statute. Rabb did not directly state that an
embryo must be capable of becoming a human being, but she did begin to hedge
toward this interpretation by implication. "Moreover," she wrote, "a human
embryo, as that term is virtually universally understood, has the potential to
develop in the normal course of events into a living human being." Rabb
Memorandum, supra note 15, at 3 (emphasis added). The inference that Rabb
draws is that human pluripotent stem cells have no such capacity, and therefore
they are not embryos within the protection of the rider. Id.
20011
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Although Smith's letter demanded a correction and reversal of Rabb's
interpretation and Varmus's decision, the response from HHS Secretary
Donna Shalala accepted the new interpretation as a given. She assured
Smith that "Dr. Varmus and his colleagues at the [NIH would] proceed
with great caution to ensure that the highest standards [would be] set
before moving forward in this area."50 Shalala pointed out that Rabb's
memorandum relied on the statutory definition of "embryo," rather than
any new definition thereof,5 and supported Rabb's analysis by noting that
"[t]he plain language of the statute supports the opinion issued by the
General Counsel. The law applies by its terms to research in which 'a
human embryo or embryos are destroyed' ... , and not to research
preceding or following such research projects. 52
2. The Report of the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission
Several months prior to Rabb's memorandum and the exchange of
letters between Smith and Shalala, President Clinton asked the NBAC to
review all issues involved in human embryonic stem cell research,
"balancing all ethical and medical considerations." 53 In September 1999,
NBAC released its report, which consisted of five chapters covering the
scientific, legal and ethical aspects of human embryo research and
concluding with thirteen recommendations regarding the appropriateness
or inappropriateness of current research.- NBAC recommended that the
48. Letter from Christopher Smith to Donna E. Shalala, supra note 10, at 3.
Richard Doerflinger commented: "The [Clinton] Administration is not sure it
could win a vote in Congress to reverse the current funding ban on embryo
research. So it has done an end run around the law instead." Doerflinger, supra
note 29, at 13. Having interpreted the ban as not applying to stem cell research,
" the NIH can achieve its goal without having to change the law." Id.
49. "We call upon you to correct the General Counsel's interpretation and to
reverse Dr. Varmus's decision." Letter from Christopher Smith to Donna E.
Shalala, supra note 10, at 1.
50. Letter from Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
to Christopher H. Smith, Congressman, 1 (Feb. 23, 1999) (on file with author).
51. Id.
52. Letter from Donna E. Shalala to Christopher H. Smith, supra note 50, at
2.
53. THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 2. President Clinton's request came
in November 1998, the same month in which two teams of scientists reported their
success in culturing embryonic stem cells.
54. See generally THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8.
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federal government fund research on stem cells derived from "leftover"
IVF embryos, as well as research in deriving the cells from embryos, by
way of exception to the present ban.5
The NBAC report began with an explanation of stem cell research, its
importance and its potential for curing injuries and disease." The NBAC
distinguished between the research potential of adult stem cells and
embryonic stem cells, noting that important differences between the two
types preclude adult cells from being an alternative to research on
embryonic cells. 7
The report then turned to ethical and policy considerations. The
NBAC noted the difficulties of formulating coherent policy
recommendations in the face of such profound disagreement in the
United States regarding the legal and moral status of unborn life. 8 The
report referred to some of the varying theories of the embryo: the embryo
as a form of human life deserving respect; the embryo as a person; the
embryo as "a mere cluster of cells."59 The NBAC took the "intermediate
position" that embryos are a form of human life which deserve respect.
60
However, it is unclear from the report how this position had any differing
results than the position that the embryo is a mere cluster of cells. The
NBAC opined that although many of these issues were contested, "they
co-exist within a broad area of consensus upon which public policy can, at
least in part, be constructed.,
61
The report recommended that federal funding for research on tissue
derived from aborted fetuses be extended to research on stem cells from
aborted fetuses. In addition, the NBAC recommended extending funding
to tissue derived from leftover IVF embryos which would be "discarded"
55. Id. at 70. It is worth noting that in the language of the recommendation,
NBAC assumes that the ban extends to research on stem cells derived from living
IVF embryos. However, in the body of the text following the recommendation
and explaining it, NBAC sides with HHS and NIH in arguing that the ban, by its
plain terms, does not extend to these embryos because only the stem cells derived
therefrom will be the subjects of the funded research. Id.
56. Id. at 1, 17-23.
57. THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH, at 2 (hereinafter
"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"). See THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 12-13, 45, 57
(discussion of the preliminary studies on AS cells and reaffirmation of the
importance of continuing research on both types of cells).
58. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 57, at 2.
59. Id. See THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 49-50.
60. THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 50.
61. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 57, at 2.
2001]
782 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 17:771
in any event. In a sentence, the NBAC justified this by virtue of its goal:
"[a] principal ethical justification for public sponsorship of research with
human ES [embryonic stem] or EG [embryonic germ] cells is that this
research has the potential to produce health benefits for individuals who
are suffering from serious and often fatal diseases."63 The NBAC also
observed that the current ban on such research reflected either a "moral
point of view" that embryos are persons and therefore must be protected,
or that there was "sufficient controversy" on the matter to preclude
federal funding at present. The NBAC concluded that this policy
conflicted with the "beneficent" goals of medicine, namely "healing,
prevention and research," 65 and therefore should be reconsidered.
The report also argued that there was no significant ethical distinction
between deriving the cells from embryos and using them in scientific
research.66 In other words, if federal funding is available for research that
uses such cells, federal funding should be available for research that
initially derives the cells. This argument presumes the statutory
interpretation of Rabb's memorandum, rather than the interpretation of
Smith and the other members of Congress. Smith argued that neither type
67
of research could be funded under the present law. Again, the NBAC
appealed to the value of scientific progress as the justification for federal
funding.68
The report went on to recommend that Congress not extend federal
funding to the creation of embryos solely for research purposes.9 The
NBAC argued the existence of a morally relevant difference between
creating an embryo for research and using an embryo that had already
been created for another purpose but was no longer needed.70  The
NBAC noted that some who object do so on the grounds that human
62. Id. at 2-3.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3.
67. See discussion above; Letter from Christopher Smith to Donna E. Shalala,
supra note 10.
68. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 57, at 4. "[W]e believe that it is
important that federal funding be made available for protocols that also derive
such cells. Relying on cell lines that might be derived exclusively by a subset of
privately funded researchers who are interested in this area could severely limit
scientific and clinical progress." Id.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id.
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dignity precludes such activity, 7 but the NBAC itself declined to pursue
specifically creating embryos because at present there is no compelling
72
scientific or clinical reason to do so.
3. NIH's new guidelines
On December 2, 1999, NIH published draft guidelines for federally
funded research on human embryos.73 After a period of public comment
ending February 22, 2000, NIH revised the draft and issued its new
Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells
74(Guidelines) on August 25, 2000, effective immediately. The summary
states that the Guidelines "establish procedures to help ensure that NIH-
funded research in this area is conducted in an ethical and legal
manner."
75
The Guidelines apply to research involving stem cells derived from
either human fetal tissue or excess IVF embryos that have not formed a
mesoderm.76 They provide that NIH funds may not be used to derive the
cells from human embryos, and that the derivation process must be
accomplished prior to the NIH research, without federal funding.77
To ensure that the stem cells used are derived from IVF embryos in
excess of clinical need, NIH listed certain hortatory guidelines. 8 Since the
donation of the embryos must be voluntary, "no inducements (monetary
or otherwise) should have been offered" for the embryos.79 There also
"should have been a clear separation" between the couple's decision to
create embryos for the purpose of having children, and its decision to
71. Id. "Those who object to creating embryos for research often appeal to
arguments about respecting human dignity by avoiding instrumental use of human
embryos (i.e., using embryos merely as a means to some other goal does not treat
them with appropriate respect or concern as a form of human life)." Id.
72. Id. at 6.
73. Draft National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Involving
Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 64 Fed. Reg. 67,576 (Dec. 2, 1999).
74. 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976, (Aug. 25, 2000).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 51,979. The mesoderm is "the middle of the three primary germ
layers of the embryo[.]" THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 9, app. B at 86.
77. Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 51,979.
78. Id. With the exception of the prohibition on derivation, the other
guidelines are all written as exhortations rather than commands (e.g., "informed
consent should have been obtained").
79. Id.
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donate the 'leftovers' for scientific research. 0 To this end, the physician
treating the couple for infertility should not be the same person seeking
the embryonic stem cells for research."' Also, to ensure the embryos are
truly in excess, they should be frozen." Finally, parents should give their
informed consent to the donation of their embryos for research. This
includes "a statement that embryos donated will not be transferred to a
woman's uterus and will not survive the human pluripotent stem cell
derivation process." 3
The Guidelines establish documentary requirements to ensure that
researchers have complied with these norms. The NIH Pluripotent Stem
Cell Review Group is charged with reviewing such documentation, as well
as reviewing new and continuing applications for research grants.8
4. Recent Legislative Initiatives
Congress has not passed legislation in response to NIH's interpretation
of the ban on federal funding for embryonic stem cell research, but there
have been several initiatives. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) noted that
an attempt in 1999 to eliminate the ban from the appropriations bill was
dropped to avoid a filibuster. Senator Specter chairs the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Human Services and
Education, which originated the funding ban. He explained that the
prohibition was imposed at a time when no one "really knew the
miraculous potential of stem cells."8 Since the scientific breakthrough
was reported in November 1998, this appropriations subcommittee has
held seven hearings on the issue.87
In January 2000, during the period of public comment on the NIH draft
guidelines, Senator Specter introduced the Stem Cell Research Act of
2000 into Congress. 88 This proposed bill would extend federal funding to
the actual derivation of stem cells from human embryos. Like the NIH
Guidelines, the proposed Act would permit only the use of "excess" IVF
80. Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 51,979.
81. Id. at 51,980.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 51,981.
85. 146 Cong. Rec. S9447-S9448 (Sept. 28, 2000).
86. Id. at S9448.
87. Id.
88. S. 2015, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query (last visited Mar. 7, 2001).
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embryos with the informed consent of their "progenitors. "'9 Consistent
with the NIH Guidelines, the legislation would prohibit federal funding
for cloning and for the creation of human embryos for research
purposes.9° In addition, it would make unlawful the transfer of human
gametes or embryos for valuable consideration by a federally funded
researcher. 9'
B. American Jurisprudence on the Legal Status of Unborn Life
1. The legal status of human embryos in the research context:
Doe v. Shalala2
Understandably, there is a scarcity of case law on embryo research. At
least in the abortion context, embryos are not recognized as human
persons, and therefore lack standing to bring suit against aggressors or
would-be aggressors. The 1994 case Doe v. Shalala presented the federal
district court in Maryland a rare opportunity to examine this issue.
The plaintiffs in Doe were "Mary Doe," an unspecified embryo whom
the Complaint described as "a pre-born child in being as a human
embryo;" Michael Policastro, an adult suffering from Down Syndrome;
and The Michael Fund, a non-profit organization which sponsors research
concerning Down Syndrome and related disorders.93  The plaintiffs
brought suit against HHS and NIH and their directors individually, as well
as the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel (the Panel) and the
individual members thereof.94
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Panel from issuing a report to HHS
containing recommendations concerning federal funding for embryo
89. Id. § 498C(b).
90. Id. § 498C(c)(1).
91. Id. § 498C(c)(2).
92. Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421 (D.Md. 1994).
93. Id. at 1423-24. The Michael Fund was named for plaintiff Michael
Policastro. Id.
94. Id. at 1424. The Panel was created following the passage of the NIH
Revitalization Act of 1993, which provided that:
[t]he Secretary of HHS may not withhold federal funds for clinical
research 'because of ethical considerations' unless she first convenes an
ethics advisory board" which either recommends that HHS not fund the
particular research, or which recommends that HHS fund the research,
but for such reasons that the Secretary finds to be "arbitrary or
capricious.
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research, contending that the Panel was stacked in favor of "unfettered
human embryo research."95 The plaintiffs argued that at least ten of the
nineteen Panel members were current or former NIH grantees who
strongly favored such research and, by implication, stood to gain by
96making recommendations in their own interest.
The district court dismissed the suit because "Mary Doe" could not be
a proper plaintiff,2 and because Michael Policastro and The Michael Fund
did not present a real case or controversy under the U.S. Constitution98
and did not demonstrate a real injury.99 Policastro and The Michael Fund
argued that if HHS granted federal funds to embryo research, it would
injure them by diverting federal funds away from Down Syndrome
research.1" They further argued that the NIH report, and the federal
funding which would result therefrom, endangered Policastro's life by
"hav[ing] the effect of making socially acceptable, and ultimately fully
legal, the destruction of people with Down's Syndrome.""1 '
The district court's dismissal of "Mary Doe" as a plaintiff derived from
the Supreme Court's ruling in the abortion context of Roe.'02 The district
court stated:
First, philosophical and religious considerations aside, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that the word "person," as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the
unborn. It has thus been held that embryos are not persons with
legally protectable interests .... The Court sees no distinction
between fetuses in utero or ex utero.103
This conclusion has been criticized, however, for assuming that the
holding in Roe can and must apply to all forms of pre-born human life.
Roe's reasoning was based on the adversarial context of maternal rights
95. Id. at 1425.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
99. Doe, 862 F.Supp. at 1427.
100. Id. at 1428.
101. Id. It is unclear from the court's opinion whether Policastro argued that
such destruction would occur because embryos with Down Syndrome would be
the subjects of research, or whether Policastro was making a "thin edge of the
wedge" argument that this would ultimately lead society to the point of
destructive experiments on those already born with Down Syndrome.
102. See Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1426.
103. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,158 (1973) (emphasis added).
104. See Feiler, supra note 6, at 2445.
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versus fetal rights. Therefore, it is possible that when no "right to
privacy" is infringed upon by the presence of the embryo or fetus, the
legal outcome could be different.
2. The legal status of human embryos in the IVF context:
Davis v. Davis'06
The legal status of the embryo may be viewed in three other ways, all of
which have arisen in the context of IVF disputes. Courts have treated the
embryo as a human person, as property, and as an entity deserving
"special respect."1°7  As the Davis case worked its way through the
Tennessee court system, all three theories were relied upon.
Davis began as a divorce action between Junior Lewis Davis and Mary
Sue Davis, a couple who had participated in an IVF program during their
marriage.19 During the course of the program, seven embryos were
created and cryogenically preserved for later use.'0 During the divorce
proceedings, the parties were unable to agree on the disposition of the
frozen embryos. Mary Sue wanted custody of the embryos in order to
continue the IVF process, but Junior Lewis wished to keep them frozen
until he decided whether he wanted to become a father outside of
marriage.'1 t Eventually, both parties remarried and changed their
positions in the litigation. Mary Sue decided she wished to donate the
embryos to another couple attempting to have children through IVF,
while Junior Lewis preferred that the embryos be discarded."'
The trial court, having no statutory law nor precedent in common law
upon which to base its decision, held that Roe and Webster v.
Reproduction Health Services..3 did not apply because they were limited to
105. See id. ("Commentators have noted, however, that 'the discussion of the
embryo's status [as the subject of scientific procedures] must necessarily stand on
a different legal footing than that of the discussion of fetal abortion."') (citing Dan
L. Burt, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30
Hous. L. REv. 1597, 1652 (1993)).
106. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert denied sub nom. Stone v. Davis, 507
U.S. 911 (1993).
107. See id.; see also Davidoff, supra note 4, at 137-139.
108. 842 S.W.2d at 589.
109. Id. at 592.
110. Id. at 589.
111. Id. at 590.
112. Id.
113. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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the adversarial context of abortion. 1 4  The trial judge, relying on
testimony that human life begins at conception, decided that the embryos
were human persons, and as such the doctrine of parens patriae afforded
them protection.
115
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holding, and implicitly
treated the embryos as property."6 The court of appeals held that the
Davises should share a joint interest in the embryos. The court based its
opinion on Supreme Court precedent in the area of procreative choice.
Since the decision to have a child or not is a constitutionally protected
choice, the appeals court held that neither Junior nor Mary Sue could be
forced into parenthood against his or her will."1' To support its position,
the court cited York v. Jones,"' a Virginia case also involving a dispute
over frozen embryos in the IVF context. York based its holding on a
theory that embryos are property.19
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the court of
appeals, but on different grounds. The supreme court criticized the
theories of both the trial court and the court of appeals, and decided upon
a via media between the "embryo-as-person" and "embryo-as-property"
theories. The supreme court decided that the best path to follow was not
the "minuscule number of legal opinions that have involved 'frozen
embryos,"" 20 but rather the ethical standards proposed by The American
Fertility Society:
the preembryo deserves respect greater than that accorded to
human tissue but not the respect accorded to actual persons.
114. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *31-33 (Cir.
Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).
115. Id. at *35.
116. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 13, 1990) at 9. See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 142.
117. 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 at 5-6. "We have carefully analyzed
Tennessee's legislative Acts and case decisions and conclude there is no
compelling state interest to justify our ordering implantation against the will of
either party." Id. at 6.
118. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
119. Id. at 425. York involved a custody dispute between the Yorks, a couple
participating in an IVF program, and the IVF clinic, the Jones Institute. The York
court held that the Cryopreservation Agreement which the Yorks had signed
created a bailor-bailee relationship, noting that "all that is needed 'is the element
of lawful possession however created, and duty to account for the thing as the
property of another that creates the bailment[.]"' Id. (internal citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
120. 842 S.W.2d at 596.
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The preembryo is due greater respect than other human tissue
because of its potential to become a person and because of its
symbolic meaning for many people. Yet, it should not be
treated as a person, because it has not yet developed the features
of personhood, is not yet established as developmentally
121individual, and may never realize its biologic potential.
The court accepted this theory, without any indication as to what "special
respect" meant or required. While the court concluded that Mary Sue
and Junior Lewis did not have a "true property interest" in the embryos,
they had "an interest in the nature of ownership" because they had
decision-making authority over the disposition of the embryos.1 12 It is
difficult to decipher how this conclusion is any different in practice from
the embryo-as-property theory. Even if the court intended to establish a
sort of fiduciary relationship between the embryos .and their parents, in
actuality it seems to be a meaningless distinction.
3. The legal status of human embryos in the context of tort
law
While the Davis trial court's holding did not prevail on appeal, its
holding that nonviable embryos were human persons was not
unprecedented in American law. In the context of tort law, unborn
human beings are considered legal persons by a majority of jurisdictions,
many of which hold that there is no legal distinction between viability and
nonviability at the time of injury for purposes of standing. In other
words, a child who has sustained injuries prior to birth may bring, through
his guardian ad litem, a personal injury or wrongful death suit against the
tortfeasor who caused the injuries or death.
In the last half century, tort law underwent a significant change in this
regard. Early twentieth century cases uniformly rejected a right to sue in
tort for prenatal injuries or wrongful death."' Courts reasoned that a
child in the womb was not yet in existence, and therefore no duty of care
could be owed to the child. Beginning in 1946, however, a series of
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 597.
123. See, e.g., Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight
From Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 47-58
(1993); Lynch v. Scheininger, 744 A.2d 113, 120 (N.J. 2000).
124. See Linton, supra note 123, at 47-49.
125. PROSSER & KEATON, PROSSER & KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 367
(5th ed. 1984).
126. See, e.g., Justice Holmes's opinion in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
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cases throughout the United States reversed this trend. Every jurisdiction
now recognizes an action in tort for both prenatal injuries (if the child
survives) and wrongful death (if he or she does not)."'
An example of current tort law is New Jersey's decision in Smith v.
Brennan.12 Two and a half months before he was born, Sean Smith was
injured in an automobile collision, resulting in deformities to his legs and
feet. After Sean's birth, his father brought suit on his behalf, arguing that
the defendants owed a duty of care to Sean even before his birth.
The lower court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, based on a precedent set in 1942 by the New Jersey Court of
Errors and Appeals in Stemmer v. Kline.129 The court in Stemmer had
relied on the fact that there was no statutory basis for a cause of action for
prenatal injury, and at the time there was no American case law in any
court of last resort that would support such an action."30 Due to
advancements in law and medicine, the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Smith agreed to revisit the issue.
The court in Smith expressly overruled Stemmer, holding that a
surviving child should have a cause of action in tort for prenatal injuries,
whether or not the child was viable at the time of the injury."' The court
first surveyed the current state of the law, noting that there had been a
marked change since the time of the Stemmer decision. No court refused
to recognize this cause of action since 1942, and at least four of the states
recognizing this right had overruled prior decisions denying liability.13z
The court in Smith then rejected the premise of the prior rule: that an
unborn child was part of his mother and therefore not a person to whom a
duty of care could be owed."' Both medical and legal authorities had
recognized that the child was a separate being from the mother from the
time of conception, even if dependent upon her for sustenance."'Further, other areas of law recognized the separate existence and rights of
Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), in which the court denied recovery to a child
who died at birth resulting from prenatal injuries. The court based its decision on
the lack of precedent and on the assumption that a child in the womb was merely
a part of his or her mother. Id. at 17.
127. PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 125, at 368.
128. 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).
129. 26 A.2d 489 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
130. See Smith, 157 A.2d at 498.
131. Id. at 504-05.
132. Id. at 501.
133. Id. at 502.
134. Id. (citing medical and legal authorities).
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unborn children. The court in Smith noted that criminal law regarded the
unborn child as separate from his mother; the law of property and
decedent's estates considered the unborn child a "life in being" for
purposes of inheritance; and that the Workmen's Compensation Act
allowed the unborn child the ability to recover monies as a dependent of
his deceased father. The court concluded that since the child was
injured, and he clearly had rights in other areas of law prior to his birth,
he should be able to recover for prenatal injuries. The court dismissed the
argument that an unborn child is not a "person in being."
There is no question that conception sets in motion biological processes
which if undisturbed will produce what every one will concede to be a
person in being. If in the meanwhile those processes can be disrupted
resulting in harm to the child when born, it is immaterial whether before
birth the child is considered a person in being.
116
In a case such as this, justice requires that the child have a "legal right
to begin life with a sound mind and body."'37
Finally, the court in Smith rejected the distinction between unborn
children who were viable at the time of the injury and those who were
not. Such a rule was impossible to apply in practice, because there is no
way to draw a bright-line distinction in borderline cases.'38 More
importantly, the injury is the same whether the child is viable or not, and
it would be unjust to permit only viable unborn children to recover for
tortiously inflicted prenatal injuries.
II. ANALYSIS OF EMBRYO RESEARCH IN THE CONTEXT OF JOHN
PAUL II'S EVANGELIUM VITAE, "THE GOSPEL OF LIFE"
A. The Role of Religious Arguments in Public Debate
What can a religious perspective contribute to our understanding of
political and social issues, especially concerning the current treatment of
unborn human life? One answer to that question is that religious
perspectives give us a fuller perspective on the issues at hand. After all,
many Americans identify themselves with some form of organized faith,
including legislators and judges, and there is no reason why we should try
135. Id.
136. Id. at 503.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 504.
139. Id.
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to "sanitize" our public debates from the sources of our values.' 40 "Such
was the vision of our Founding Fathers: The First Amendment was not
intended to impose limits on religious discourse, but rather to ensure the
possibility of a truly robust public forum in which all opinions would be
respected and heard. '14 Politicians and lawyers of religious faith need not
leave their consciences in the cloakroom along with their coats when
entering our nation's statehouses and courtrooms.1
41
A second important contribution that religious perspectives make is
that they act as a type of leavening 143 to help transform society, hopefully
for the better. By way of example, the current demeanor of American
law and politics has become dominated by a concern for individual rights
and liberties. However, our rights talk has acquired certain peculiarities
that distinguish it from the rights talk in other countries.'" In American
discourse, rights tend to assume an absolutist character and a "relentless
individualism" which overlooks our corresponding civic responsibilities.'
Those who belong to churches and other faith communities can help to
140. The NBAC acknowledged the importance of considering religious
positions on the moral status of embryos and the permissibility and boundaries of
embryo research. THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 99. In Appendix E of its
report, it provided a summary of presentations on religious perspectives given at
Georgetown University on May 7, 1999. Id. The Committee noted that
[allthough it would be inappropriate for religious views to determine
public policy in our country, such views are the products of long
traditions of ethical reflection, and they often overlap with secular views.
Thus, the Commission believed that testimony from scholars of religious
ethics was crucial to its goal of informing itself about the range, content,
and rationale of various ethical positions regarding research in this area.
Id.
141. Adam Maida, Shaping Culture and Law: Religion's Voice, Address at
the University of Detroit Mercy Law School for the McElroy Lecture (Mar. 16,
1999), in ORIGINS, Apr. 8, 1999, at 723.
142. The author was given this insight by Bishop Raymond Boland during his
homily at the Red Mass in Washington, D.C. on October 3, 1999.
143. When teaching people about the kingdom of God, Jesus used this
analogy. "To what shall I compare the reign of God? It is like yeast which a
woman took to knead into three measures of flour until the whole mass of dough
began to rise." Luke 13:20-21. Once added, leaven by its very nature transforms
the mixture.
144. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 7 (1991).
145. Id. at 14. Glendon identifies the distinguishing characteristics of
American rights talk as absoluteness, silence concerning responsibilities, relentless
individualism, neglect of civil society and insularity. Id.
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balance this political posture by refocusing attention on the
•. . 141
responsibilities all people bear toward the common good.
Having said this, it is important to reiterate that religious beliefs cannot
be the sole motivation for our policy or legislation on any given issue.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment recognizes the right of
religious believers to enter the public arena with their ideas, but the
Establishment Clause prevents the government from passing laws which
show preference to one religious group over another.147 Valid secular
arguments must be made as well - arguments based on reason alone and
not on any specifically religious premises. In this way, public policy and
legislation will not be based on specific religious premises that only some
accept.
B. Evangelium Vitae: John Paul's Approach to the Human Person
and to Bioethics
1. John Paul's approach
John Paul wrote Evangelium Vitae in 1995 as an encyclical letter
addressed to the Catholic Church and to all people of good will. In the
encyclical, he addressed certain present-day threats to human life, which
manifest what John Paul called the "culture of death."'4 9 He contrasted
the culture of death with the "gospel of life," a term he coined to describe
the overall message of the dignity of the human person and the sacredness
of life as taught in the gospels.5 He discussed the Biblical commandment
"You shall not kill," focusing particularly on euthanasia and abortion.
5
'
He then discussed how Christians, and all "people of good will," are
called to confront the culture of death with the gospel of life, both in word
146. See Maida, supra note 141, at 724-725.
147. "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another[.]" Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
This does not mean that any law that reflects the position of a particular religious
group is by that very fact invalid. Such a view would result in a total paralysis of
our legal system, since many of our laws reflect moral positions held by religious
believers as part of their faith.
148. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, at title page.
149. Id. 12.
150. Id. 2.
151. Abortion is discussed in detail in Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, %$ 58-
63, and euthanasia is discussed in 64-67.
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and example."'
John Paul was well aware of the fact that he was addressing many
people living in pluralistic societies, where the gospel - and indeed
• 153
religious belief altogether - is not considered normative. However, as a
religious leader, he wished to establish and meditate upon the religious
nature of our obligation to respect life, an obligation that is rooted in an
understanding of the human being as a creature of God. 54 John Paul,
therefore, based his approach on both reason and revelation.' He
maintains that every human person is sacred and inviolable, and that this
sacredness is knowable, both by the light of reason and by cultivation of a
relationship with God the creator.
2. John Paul's critique of modern trends in law and ethics
John Paul began his critique of the modern trends against life by
describing the culture of death. This culture is fueled by a habit of
viewing everything - including human life - in terms of what is
"efficient. '  Thus a human life which would require more care and
acceptance (e.g., because of physical or mental impairments) is
"considered useless, or held to be an intolerable burden, and therefore
rejected in one way or another."'56
He considered a wide panorama of the current trends against life,
including contraception, abortion, non-therapeutic embryo research,
prenatal diagnosis leading to eugenic abortion and infanticide andS • 159
euthanasia, and then examined both the causes and the consequences.
152. See id. ll 78-79.
153. See id. 2.
154. See id. ("Man is called to a fullness of life which far exceeds the
dimensions of his earthly existence, because it consists in sharing the very life of
God.") Id.
155. This is typical of neo-scholasticism, a modern application of medieval
scholasticism, which was a system of philosophical and theological reasoning
based on the writings of church fathers and Aristotle and his commentators. The
"twin traits of neo-scholasticism" have been identified as "a simultaneous appeal
to the power of reason to propose precise moral propositions and an appeal to the
authority of the Church's magisterium... to fix a particular point of moral
doctrine." John J. Conley, S.J., Narrative, Act, Structure: John Paul H's Method of
Moral Analysis, in CHOOSING LIFE, A DIALOGUE ON EVANGELIUM VITAE 3, 8
(Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J. & Alan C. Mitchell eds., 1997) (citing Avery Dulles).
156. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, $I 2.
157. Id. 12.
158. Id.
159. Id. $l 13-15.
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He noted a marked contradiction between these trends against life and
the trends in favor of human rights. He observed that the very idea of
"human rights" is that they are "rights inherent in every person and prior
to any Constitution and State legislation. '"' 60
At the roots of this contradiction, John Paul notes a number of trends
in modern thinking which reflect an extreme form of subjectivism.61
While the theory of human rights is predicated on the affirmation that the
human person can neither be used, nor subjected to domination by others,
there is a widespread mentality that recognizes human rights only in those
who are no longer "dependent" upon others. 16 This is coupled with a
mentality that equates human dignity with the capacity for• .• 163
communication. These are not ontological criteria (e.g., "who am I?"),
but rather functional criteria which determine who is a human person on
the basis of developed capacities (e.g., "what am I able to do?"). 1
Closely linked with subjectivism is a "notion of freedom which exalts
160. Id. 18.
161. Id. 19.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. An example of this can be found in the thought of Mary Anne Warren, a
philosophy professor at San Francisco State University. In an article in support of
abortion, she defines the "human person" as one belonging to the "moral
community." Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, in
ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 276, 281 (John D. Arras & Nancy K.
Rhoden eds., 1989). She suggests that "the moral community consists of all and
only people, rather than human beings... " refusing to rely on the criteria of
genetics alone to establish who warrants the protection of our laws. Id. She offers
five concepts which are "most central" to our concept of personhood: (1)
consciousness, particularly the capacity to feel pain; (2) reasoning; (3) self-
motivated activity; (4) the capacity to communicate; and (5) the presence of self-
concepts and self-awareness. Id. at 282. On this basis, she concludes that "[a]ll we
need to claim, to demonstrate that a fetus is not a person, is that any being which
satisfies none of (1) - (5) is certainly not a person." Id. By the same token, she
argues,
A man or woman whose consciousness has been permanently obliterated
but who remains alive is a human being which is no longer a person;
defective human beings, with no appreciable mental capacity, are not and
presumably never will be people; and a fetus is a human being which is
not yet a person and which therefore cannot coherently be said to have
full moral rights.
Id. at 282-283. Thus, in the thought of Mary Ann Warren, a human being can slip
in and out of personhood depending solely upon his or her capacities at any given
time.
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the isolated individual in an absolute way, and gives no place to solidarity,
to openness to others and service of them." '65 Such a concept of freedom
is really license, a negation of any limitations placed on the individual by
society. Moreover, this "freedom negates and destroys itself ... when it
no longer recognizes and respects its essential link with the truth.""" No
longer is truth the reference point for our choices about good and evil, but
only the individual's "subjective and changeable opinion or, indeed, his
selfish interest and whim."'67
This view of freedom and absolute autonomy leads to a distortion of
the individual's relationship to the community9
While each person wishes to assert his own interests as against others,
such a view requires compromises to be made in order to ensure the
• . •169
maximum possible freedom for each individual.
In this way, any reference to common values and to a truth absolutely
binding on everyone is lost, and social life ventures on to the shifting
sands of complete relativism. At that point, everything is negotiable,
everything is open to bargaining: even the first of the fundamental rights,
the right to life. 70
Essentially, such a theory leads to a denial that "rights" are based on
human nature, but instead treats rights as a sort of social contract which
we agree upon for convenience. If this is the case, the powerful can easily
bargain to keep and increase their own "rights," while diminishing or
removing altogether the "rights" of the weak and defenseless.
This denial of rights has reached the level of government as well,
leading to what John Paul considered false notions of democracy. 7' No
longer do democracies recognize the inalienable rights belonging to all
people. Instead, democracy has come to mean merely the will of the
• • 172
majority, or "Might makes Right." Thus, the State is transformed into a
tyrant, "which arrogates to itself the right to dispose of the life of the
165. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, T[ 19.
166. Id.; see also Richard Neuhaus, The Splendor of Truth: A Symposium,
FIRST THINGS, Jan. 1994, at 15. "When truth itself is democratized-when truth is
no more than the will of each individual or a majority of individuals-democracy,
deprived of the claim to truth, stands naked to its enemies. Thus does freedom,
when it is not 'ordered to truth,' undo freedom." Id.
167. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, 19.
168. Id. 20.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
Embryonic Stem Cell Research
weakest and most defenseless members, from the unborn child to the
elderly, in the name of a public interest which is really nothing but the
interest of one part."'73 This is no longer true democracy, in John Paul's
view, because the democratic ideal must necessarily acknowledge and
protect the rights of every human being, not just the strongest. 74
John Paul discerned an "eclipse of the sense of God and of man" at the
heart of this modern tragedy.
71
[W]hen the sense of God is lost, there is also a tendency to lose
the sense of man, of his dignity and his life; in turn, the
systematic violation of the moral law, especially in the serious
matter of respect for human life and its dignity, produces a kind
of progressive darkening of the capacity to discern God's living
176and saving presence.
John Paul argued in this passage that there is an inherent danger in the
secularization of any society, because discarding a belief in God as our
creator leads to a progressive deterioration of our understanding of
ourselves as his creatures.
Once human beings abandon a belief in God, a temptation exists to see
173. Id.
174. Id. But see Justice Scalia's remarks during a question and answer session
following his address at a symposium entitled "Left, Right and the Common
Good," held at the Gregorian University in Rome in 1996. In response to a
question about natural law and what is due to man by his very nature, Scalia
responded,
It just seems to me incompatible with democratic theory that it's good
and right for the state to do something that the majority of the people do
not want done. Once you adopt the democratic theory, it seems to me,
you accept that proposition. If the people, for example, want abortion,
the state should permit abortion in a democracy. If the people do not
want it, the state should be able to prohibit it as well.
Antonin Scalia, Of Democracy, Morality and the Majority, ORIGINS, June 27, 1999,
at 81, 87. Later, he pushed the point even further:
You protect minorities only because the majority determines that there
are certain minorities or certain minority positions that deserve
protection. Thus in the U.S. Constitution we have removed from the
majoritarian system of democracy the freedom of speech, the freedom of
religion and a few other freedoms that are named in the Bill of Rights.
The whole purpose of that is that the people themselves, that is to say,
the majority, agree to the rights of the minority on those subjects - but
not on other subjects.
Id. at 88.
175. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, J 21.
176. Id.
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ourselves as merely one among the animals, even if at the high end of the
evolutionary scale.1" If humans are not the creatures of a higher spiritual
Being (God), then there is little reason to suppose that humans
themselves have any real "spiritual" aspect. The human being, in this
viewpoint, is thus reduced to the sum total of his or her physical nature:
"[man] is somehow reduced to being 'a thing,' and no longer grasps the
'transcendent' character of his 'existence as man."'17 8 Instead, "[l]ife itself
become[s] a mere 'thing,' which man claims as his exclusive property,
completely subject to his control and manipulation."'79 Thus birth and
death become "things to be merely 'possessed' or 'rejected"' - andI. .180
manipulated by technology - rather than experiences to be lived.
John Paul argued that this failure to understand the very nature of the
human person and the meaning of human life leads to individualism,
utilitarianism and hedonism.' "The values of being are replaced with
those of having," 18 John Paul observed. Rather than human life being a
good in and of itself, the modern mentality has identified the value of life
as dependent upon its ability to bring us pleasure or efficiency. This is
the argument of utilitarianism: all our actions are motivated by seeking
pleasure and avoiding pain, and therefore what is good is what is useful in
achieving pleasure and avoiding pain.' 84 In such a cultural climate, the
values of the marketplace - efficiency and consumerism - spill over into
our understanding of the human person and especially the human body.
The body is reduced to its material nature, as noted above; "it is simply a
complex of organs, functions and energies to be used according to the sole
criteria of pleasure and efficiency. ' ...
Against this moral and cultural climate, John Paul posited that "[l]ife is
177. Id. '1 22.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. 23.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF, SOCRATES TO SARTRE: A HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY 362 (Stephanie K. Harper & James R. Belser eds., McGraw Hill,
Inc., 1988) (1966). The utilitarians, chiefly identified with Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill, thought that human actions should be ordered to "'the greatest
good of the greatest number,' and by which they meant that 'good' is achieved
when the aggregate of pleasure is greater than the aggregate of pain. An act is
good, therefore, if it is useful in achieving pleasure and diminishing pain." Id.
185. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, 1 23.
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always a good."'8' This is because life comes from God the creator, who
created human beings with a unique rational and spiritual nature, as a
"manifestation of God in the world, a sign of his presence, a trace of his
glory.' 187 Because humans are the summit of creation, made in the image
of God, humans cannot be reduced to the level of "things."' 188 The sacred
and inviolable character of human life reflects the inviolable character of
God, who alone has the right over human life and death. 89
John Paul argued that from this sacredness of human life, it necessarily
follows that certain moral norms protecting life are absolute and cannot
be compromised in any way. 90 This includes the injunction against the
deliberate taking of innocent human life, at any stage or condition of
existence.'9 ' The sacredness of the human person means that "[t]he
deliberate decision to deprive an innocent human being of his life is
always morally evil and can never be licit either as an end in itself or as a
means to a good end."' '9 John Paul rejected any attempt to justify such
transgressions by means of proportionalism, which holds that certain
human lives (typically, those of the unborn and the disabled, the weakest
and most defenseless humans) are only a relative good.9 "[A]ccording to
a proportionalist approach, or one of sheer calculation, this good should
be compared with and balanced against other goods."' 94 In dealing with
exceptionless moral norms - and John Paul does not hold that all moral
norms are absolute or exceptionless - balancing acts are totally
inappropriate because they reduce the value of the human person to a
relative good which can be negotiated or bargained away.195
John Paul's view of bioethics, and embryo research in particular, is in
accord with the view of the dignity of the human person set forth in
Evangelium Vitae. Science and technology are goods that must be put at
the service of human persons and their integral development. '9 He
praised the efforts of medical science in finding ever more effective
186. Id. 34.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. 91 53.
190. Id. 57.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. 68.
194. Id.
195. See id. 20.
196. Id. % 81.
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treatments, 97 yet argues that scientific progress cannot be pursued in such
a way as to put humans at the service of science rather than science at the
service of humans.
Because human life originates from God and is sacred from the very
beginning, embryos must be treated with the dignity owed to all human
persons." John Paul argued for the licitness of medical procedures
carried out for the benefit of the embryos themselves, respecting their life
and integrity and not subjecting them to any disproportionate risks.
However, he strongly condemned the use and destruction of embryos for
research purposes, which is done under the pretext of "progress," but in
fact "reduces human life to the level of simple 'biological material' to be
freely disposed of."' 99 Human beings cannot be used as a mere means to
an end, no matter how good that end is; the price is too heavy to pay.
3. Analysis of the arguments surrounding federal funding for
embryonic stem cell research in light of Evangelium Vitae
John Paul begins with the proposition that human life is sacred from
the moment of conception to its natural end. This fact alone dictates his
approach to the permissibility of harmful, non-therapeutic research on
embryos: it is a "crime against their dignity as human beings."' '° Because
embryonic stem cell research necessarily entails not only the use of
embryos as a mere means to an end, but also their destruction, in John
Paul's view, it constitutes "an absolutely unacceptable act." ''
As a preliminary observation, it may seem misplaced to focus on
federal funding, when in John Paul's view permitting such research at all
is an illicit exercise of political power. However, John Paul maintains that
when it is not possible to overturn a law that permits such activity, the
elected official whose opposition to such practices is well known may
licitly support legislation or policy which would limit the harm done by
the law.' °2 Since research on human embryos, and even the creation of
research embryos, is legal in most of the United States, the focus of the
debate has been primarily on the advisability of extending public funds to
this activity.2°3
197. See id. 26.
198. Id. 60.
199. Id. T 14, 63.
200. Id. 63.
201. Id.
202. Id. 73.
203. THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. Nine states have proscribed
such research, however. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1986 &
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Congress placed a moratorium on federal funding for embryo research
in 1975 in a patent attempt to limit the harmfulness of the state laws that
permit it. 204 HHS' memorandum and NIH's revision of its norms are
disingenuous at best. The fact that NIH had abided by the moratorium
for the previous five years should be sufficient evidence that it knew such
research was not permitted with federal tax dollars. The HHS
memorandum and letter to Christopher Smith do not fairly deal with
ethics or policy, but rather assume the research is ethically sound on the
grounds of usefulness, and work to find (or create) a loophole in the
federal law.
The NBAC's report manifests the utilitarianism and proportionalism
that John Paul condemned as unbefitting the inherent dignity of the
human person. This is evident not only in the language of the report, but
indeed from the very task with which President Clinton entrusted the
NBAC. President Clinton's letter to Harold Shapiro noted that at the
time Clinton banned the use of federal funds for creation of research
embryos, "the benefits of human stem cell research were hypothetical,
while the ethical concerns were immediate." 20 5 President Clinton then
observed that the progress of science had now changed the situation:
Although the ethical issues have not diminished, it now appears
that this research may have real potential for treating such
devastating illnesses as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and
Parkinson's disease. With this in mind, I am also requesting that
the Commission undertake a thorough review of the issues....
206balancing all ethical and medical considerations.
Having been commissioned to make a utilitarian calculus of the burdens
versus the benefits of embryo research, the NBAC took this philosophical
approach to ethics as normative to its task.
From the very beginning of the report, the NBAC recounts with
palpable excitement the potential benefits of human embryonic stem cell
Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a)l (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145.422 subd. 1 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.2-01 and -
02 (1997 & Supp. 1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(a) (West 2000); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1999
& Supp. 2000).
204. THE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 11, at 2.
205. Letter from President Bill Clinton to Dr. Harold Shapiro, Chair,
National Bioethics Advisory Commission 1 (Nov. 14, 1998) reprinted in THE
NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 89.
206. Id. (emphasis added).
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research. The Executive Summary notes that "scientists regard these cells
as an important - perhaps essential - means for understanding the earliest
stages of human development and as an important tool in the
development of life-saving drugs[.]"2°7 From considering the embryonic
cells as "means" or "tools," it is a short step to considering the embryos
themselves to be means or tools in a scientific race to gain knowledge and
cure disease. Although the NBAC acknowledges at one point that there
may be a "concern about instrumentalization," it never addresses the
issue.' °8 Instead, it concluded that once the scientific goal is urgent or
laudable enough, and the offense to public morals is low enough, such
instrumentalization of embryos and their cells is permissible; or perhaps
politically expedient.
The NBAC's report is obviously a compromise document, written by a
panel who had to make recommendations in the face of widespread public
disagreement over the status of embryos, and whether and in what ways
they should be used for research. NBAC makes obligatory references to
the varying theories which have been proposed (the embryo as property,
person or "entity deserving special respect"),0 but after claiming to adopt
the theory that the embryo is an entity deserving respect, the Committee
continues to engage in utilitarian calculations and proportionalist
balancing. The proposed justification for funding such research is, of
course, the potential for health benefits for those who are suffering.
While this is certainly a laudable goal, John Paul's critique is that human
beings can never be used as a mere means to an end, nor reduced to their
biological or material existence alone. "The killing of innocent human
creatures, even if carried out to help others, constitutes an absolutely
unacceptable act., 210 In other words, John Paul holds that no matter what
benefits might come of such research, the ends can never justify an
immoral means."'
207. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 57, at 1. It is interesting to note that
in the body of the report itself, very similar language is used but the words
"means" and "tools" drop out: "In addition, scientists regard these cells as
important - perhaps essential - in understanding the earliest stages of human
development and in developing life-saving drugs[.]" THE NBAC REPORT, supra
note 8, at 65.
208. THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 56.
209. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 57, at 2.
210. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, 163.
211. A mirror image to John Paul's approach can be found in the work of
Ronald Green, the chief ethicist on the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel.
Green holds that all decisions about "personhood" are social conventions, based
on enlightened self-interest. If respecting an individual human being as a
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A similar critique can be made of much of the case law on unborn life.
The Doe case was riddled with standing problems, and on that count
alone could not have succeeded. It may be that the plaintiffs knew that,
but hoped for nothing more than to raise the questions in people's minds.
However, the Doe court did not need to see Roe and its progeny as
dispositive of the status of embryos outside the womb. First, as noted
earlier, the Supreme Court's abortion opinions have been decided in an
adversarial context (maternal interests vs. fetal interests). When the
mother's right to privacy is no longer a factor, judges could remain
faithful to Roe, and still decide these cases differently in an effort to limit
the harm done by Roe, Second, outside the context of abortion, the
unborn child has been recognized as a person or a "life in being" with a
wide range of rights, including the right to sue for injuries sustained
before viability."
Instead, the Doe court chose to put "philosophical and religious
considerations aside, 1 3 and hold the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence was controlling. One could certainly make the argument
that Doe is logically consistent with Roe: if embryos and fetuses have no
right to life (or no absolute right to life) in the abortion context, why
would they in any other context? However, John Paul's approach 2 14 would
be to limit the harm done by distinguishing the cases by presence or
absence of the adversarial context, and by pointing to the many other
areas of law that do recognize embryos as subjects with rights.
This is exactly what the trial court in Davis did. It distinguished
abortion jurisprudence and concluded that embryos are human lives and
deserve a chance to be born. The approach of the appeals court, however,
was to treat embryos as property, a conclusion which John Paul rejects as
degrading the dignity and sacredness of the human person. 215  The
"person" would prevent research that could help those humans who are already
accepted as persons, that in itself is a valid reason to deny such human being the
status of person. Thus, not only does the end justify the means, but the end even
determines which human beings may be treated as means. See Ronald M. Green,
Toward a Copernican Revolution. in Our Thinking About Life's Beginning and
Life's End, 66 SOUNDINGS 152 (1983).
212. In Maryland, where Doe was decided, Group Health Ass'n, Inc. v.
Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198 (Md. 1983) was controlling authority in the tort
context (rejecting viability as an appropriate cutoff point in the context of a
wrongful death action).
213. Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421, 1426 (D. Md. 1994).
214. This assumes, of course, that it is not possible to overturn or abrogate
laws permitting abortion. See Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, 1 73.
215. Id. T 22.
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members of the state supreme court were obviously troubled by this
reduction of the embryo to mere property. However, after soothing their
consciences with nicer terms ("the embryo is an entity deserving
respect"), the supreme court justices did not in any way change the appeal
court's treatment of the embryos.
The failed Stem Cell Research Act of 2000 would have expanded the
flawed logic of NBAC, Doe, and the Davis appellate courts. Upon
introducing the bill, Senator Specter dismissed any ethical concerns about
destroying living human embryos by pointing out that only discarded IVF
216
embryos would be used in such experimentation. Yet the argument that
these embryos would "die anyway" proves too much: every human being
"will die anyway., 217 The fact that a human being will die soon-because
of old age, disease, capital punishment, or abortion - does not lessen the
moral obligation to refrain from performing life - threatening
nontherapeutic experimentation on him or her. John Paul maintains that
human life, even that of the dying, is sacred and inviolable. 218 "Respect for
life requires that science and technology should always be at the service of
man and his integral development.,
219
216. Senator Arlen Specter, Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint
Resolutions (Jan. 30, 2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/queryD?rl06:2:./temp/-rlO6Ac3z5z:e): (last visited Mar. 7, 2001). "It is not a
matter of using a human embryo which has the potentiality for life to extract the
stem cells because these are embryos which have been discarded." Id.
217. David W. Louisell, The Dissenting Statement of Commissioner David W.
Louisell, in Symposium, On the Report and Recommendations of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, 22 VILL. L. REV. 297 (1976-1977). Commissioner Louisell dissented
from the commission's recommendation to allow nontherapeutic research on
fetuses in anticipation of abortion. "The argument that the fetus-to-be-aborted
'will die anyway' proves too much. All of us 'will die anyway.' A woman's
decision to have an abortion.., does not change the nature or quality of fetal
life." Id. at 317.
218. See Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, 81.
219. Id. Commissioner Louisell expressed the same principle in his dissenting
statement:
I would, therefore, turn aside any approval, even in science's name, that
would by euphemism or other verbal device, subject any unconsenting
human being, born or unborn, to harmful research, even that intended to
be good for society. Scientific purposes might be served by
nontherapeutic research on retarded children, or brain dissection of the
old who have ceased to lead "meaningful" lives, but such research is not
proposed-at least not yet. As George Bernard Shaw put it in The
Doctor's Dilemma: 'No man is allowed to put his mother in the stove
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III. COMMENT
A. Critique of John Paul's Thought
1. The validity and application of John Paul's argument in
the secular and pluralistic context
Given John Paul's explicitly religious approach to this issue, how can
his thought contribute to the debate on embryo research? John Paul
appeals to "natural law" and to reason throughout his encyclical, arguing
that any person of good will can come to recognize the sacred value of the
.• 220
human being even from the moment of conception. He is adamant in
insisting that the "gospel of life" is not for believers alone, and in this he is
not mistaken; surely respect for human life is an obligation for all people.
This is manifest in our laws on homicide, assault -and battery, dueling,
Russian roulette, suicide and so forth.
Yet how can we all agree on the "sacredness" of the human person
when our beliefs about our origins (and destinies) are so vastly divergent?
One of the most profound observations John Paul made in Evangelium
Vitae is that when humans lose the sense of the Creator, they naturally
begin to lose sight of who they, as creatures, are."' However, if this is the
case, it would seem logical that one who does not believe in God is
hopelessly stuck in this position and therefore cannot see the force of
logic in John Paul's argument.
John Paul is well aware that many people criticize the position he takes
by arguing that in a secular democracy, we cannot capitulate to the
religious and moral opinions of others. Some argue that we ought to
employ the lowest common denominator in agreeing on what norms all
will have to follow.
John Paul's answer is to point out the terrible problems that arise when
because he desires to know how long an adult woman will survive the
temperature of 500 degrees Fahrenheit, no matter how important or
interesting that particular addition to the store of human knowledge may
be.' Is it the mere youth of the fetus that is thought to foreclose the full
protection of established human experimentation norms? Such reasoning
would imply that a child is less deserving of protection than an adult. But
reason, our tradition, and the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights all
speak to the contrary, emphasizing the need of special protection for the
young.
Louisell, supra note 217, at 318.
220. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 2, IT 2, 101.
221. See id. [ 21-22.
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these arguments are pushed to their logical limits. Democracy cannot be
idolized. It is a system; a means, not an end; and it stands or falls on the
12values that it embodies. If a democracy chooses by congressional vote,
or judicial fiat, to expel a certain group of human beings from the
community of "persons" who are protected by law, we are all placed at
risk. John Paul pointed out that everyone rightly rejects many well-
known crimes against humanity experienced in the twentieth century.
Certainly there are very few people who would say that Hitler's
"solution" to the "Jewish question" (and other groups) was morally
permissible. Would such crimes cease to be crimes if he had run it
through Congress and obtained a fifty-one percent vote?223 Yet this is the
logical conclusion of extreme positions on autonomy and legal positivism.
Such a philosophy ends with a vision of democracy which deifies whatever
the majority chooses, and "gives" rights to minority groups as it pleases
instead of recognizing rights which we all have because they are inherent
in our human nature.
Despite John Paul's response to his critics, the problem remains. Even
if we can all agree that human beings have dignity, there is no consensus
on the meaning or the extent of such dignity, nor on the proper basis for a
common ground for both believers and nonbelievers alike. Indeed, even
among religious believers there is widespread disagreement on these
matters.224
2. Natural Law and Human Rights Theories
John Paul's appeal to natural law theory is a step in the right direction,
but it is not enough to salvage his argument from those who would dismiss
all arguments premised on a belief in God. Natural law theory, while not
specifically religious in character, does presuppose a natural theology;
that is, the existence of a rational Creator who "wills that the order of
nature be fulfilled in all its purposes, as these are inherent in the natures
found in the order.22" This is really a philosophical belief rather than a
theological one. It does not assume that one must worship God or
"believe in" him in the ordinary sense, but only that logic dictates that if
there is a "creation" with a discernible order or rationality to it, there
222. See id. 1[ 70.
223. See id.
224. See THE NBAC REPORT, supra note 9, app. E at 99-104 (reporting the
widely divergent positions of Catholic, Jewish, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim and
Protestant thinkers on the moral status of human embryos and the ethics of
embryonic stem cell research).
225. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 328 (1960).
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must be a rational creator behind it all. Nonetheless, this underpinning of
natural law theory would alone be enough to cause some people to reject
it as a religious approach to law and public policy.
John Paul also referred to modern day theories of human rights, which
might provide a bridge from specifically religious arguments to a more
secular approach. Following the Second World War, many ideas of
human rights that had been percolating in the Western world for theS 226
previous 200 years began to converge into a universal language of rights.
In the wake of the experience in Nazi Germany, people were seeking a
solid basis for securing fundamental human rights and liberties for all
human beings without distinction.2 1 "The idea of prepolitical 'human'
rights thus came to have wide appeal, although there was no consensus on
any secular foundation for such rights, or on their precise content.,
28
The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights might
provide a good beginning for translating John Paul's argument into a
secular approach. It is based on the premise that the "inherent dignity"
and the "equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family"
are the "foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 2 29 This
Declaration does not address the status of unborn human life. However,
if rights truly "inhere" in humans by their very nature, and are therefore
"inalienable," such rights must be coterminous with the span of a human
•. 230
being's biological existence. The idea of a human nature, after all, does
not depend on one's actual capacities at any given time. All who are
members of the human species participate equally in such a nature,
226. See GLENDON, supra note 144, at 38.
227. See id.
228. Id.
229. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 4, 4 (United Nations, 1978).
230. Paradoxically, religious beliefs could be more apt to challenge this than
nonreligious beliefs. Belief in God can lead to theories that God "ensouls" human
beings at a certain point after conception (at the fortieth day of life, for example).
If this were true, perhaps it could justify denying any legal protection to such early
human life.
On the other hand, one who does not believe in God, or that there is any spiritual
component to human nature, has nothing but biology to look to for the span of
human life or existence. In such case, either one must recognize an imperative to
respect life at all those stages, or one must concede the position of Mary Anne
Warren, supra note 164, who holds there is no inherent value to biological life.
Warren maintains that only when humans are capable of exercising rationality,
self-awareness, communicative capacities, etc., are they "persons" needing or
deserving protection of life by the legal system. See id.
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regardless of their given mental or physical abilities.
Furthermore, this is not engaging in "genetic reductionism," or
reducing the human person solely to his or her biological reality. John
Paul has argued strenuously against any such understanding of the human
person. Instead, our genetic code, which is at work from the moment of
conception, is the sine qua non of our existence. While there are some
rights that come with age or the capacity to exercise them (for example,
the right to marry, the right to vote), the most basic of human rights (the
right to life, the right not to be subjected to nontherapeutic life-
threatening experimentation) must be ascribed to each human being from
the beginning. The refusal to recognize and respect such rights would
therefore be a form of unjustified age discrimination, or perhaps
discrimination on the basis of "disability." It is a refusal to extend to one
class of human beings the most basic rights enjoyed by all others.
CONCLUSION
Scientific research and experiments cannot and should not be
conducted according to the crass utilitarian ethos promoted by the
NBAC, the NIH and certain members of Congress. If human dignity
means anything, it means we cannot create or destroy other human
beings, even those who are tiny, undeveloped and vulnerable, to pursue
scientific ends, no matter how laudable those ends may be. The fact that
stem cells might be obtained from "leftover" IVF embryos who will "die
anyway" does not lessen their human dignity, nor our duty to respect that
dignity.
The Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence is not dispositive of the
debate on embryo research. Many of our nation's laws protect early
human life and recognize a wide variety of rights for the unborn.
Congress chose to protect unborn human life by maintaining a
moratorium on embryo research, and this decision can and must be
supported by arguments which appeal to the inherent dignity of human
beings.
John Paul's contribution to this debate is invaluable insofar as it is a
much-needed critique of the more dangerous trends in law and politics
that we face in our modern democracies. The fact that John Paul based
his argument in Evangelium Vitae on explicitly religious premises does
limit the effectiveness of the argument in a secular and pluralistic society.
However, the language and theory of human rights may provide a basis
for translating John Paul's position into a language with a wider appeal in
the public forum.
